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Abstract
In this article, the author deals with the 
question; What should be Uganda’s response 
following the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (oecd)’s2 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (beps) on 
Action 6 (Prevent treaty abuse), Action 7 
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(Prevent artificial avoidance) of the Perma-
nent Establishment (pe) Status and Action 15 
(Development of Multilateral Instruments 
(mli) to modify Bilateral Tax Treaty.
In answering this question, this article 
considers;  Uganda’s existing tax treaties, 
lessons drawn from beps Action  6, What a 
Permanent Establishment (pe) means, The 
existing avoidance strategies of a pe, lessons 
drawn from beps Action 7, should Uganda 
sign or not sign the Multilateral Instruments 
(mli).
The oecd released a report on G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting ( beps) which 
comprises of 15 Action Plans to address 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting3. All the 
15 Action Plans were set out to equip gov-
ernments to domesticate international in-
struments in order to address tax avoidance 
while ensuring that profits are taxed where 
economic activities that generate profits 
are performed, and where value is created. 
All these beps 15 Action plans are broad in 
nature, and therefore, this article only deals 
with beps Actions 6, 7 and 154. 
Resumen
En este artículo, el autor aborda la cuestión 
¿Cuál debería ser la respuesta de Uganda 
después de la Erosión de Base y Cambio de 
Beneficios (beps) de la Organización para 
la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos 
(ocde) en la Acción 6 (Prevenir el abuso de 
los tratados), Acción 7 (Prevenir la evitación 
artificial) del Establecimiento Permanente 
(pe), Estado y Acción 15 (Desarrollo de 
Instrumentos Multilaterales (mli) para mo-
dificar el Tratado Fiscal Bilateral?
En respuesta a esta pregunta, este artículo 
considera los tratados tributarios existentes 
de Uganda, lecciones extraídas de la Acción 
6 de beps, lo que significa un Establecimien-
to Permanente (pe), las estrategias de evita-
ción existentes de una ep, lecciones extraídas 
de la Acción 7 de beps y, en ese sentido, si 
debe Uganda firmar o no los Instrumentos 
Multilaterales (mli).
La ocde publicó un informe sobre la ero-
sión de la base del G20 y el cambio de ga-
nancias (beps), que comprende 15 planes de 
acción para abordar la erosión de la base y 
el cambio de ganancias. Todos los 15 planes 
de acción se establecieron para equipar a los 
gobiernos para domesticar los instrumentos 
internacionales con el fin de abordar la eva-
sión fiscal, al tiempo que se garantiza que 
los beneficios se gravan donde se realizan 
las actividades económicas que generan be-
neficios y donde se crea el valor. Todos estos 
planes de acción de beps 15 son amplios y, 
por lo tanto, este artículo solo trata sobre las 
acciones 6, 7 y 15 de beps.
I.  Beps Action 6: Prevent treaty abuse
A. Tax treaties: Introduction   
The background of tax treaties is that they 
are drafted based on two models; the oecd 
and un model. A general examination of the 
two models show that; the oecd model was 
3 (n.d.). Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting - oecd.org. Retrieved September 21, 
2018, from https://www.oecd.org/ctp/bepsactionPlan.pdf.
4 See Sections 2, 3 and 4 respectively of this article.
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drafted exclusively by developed countries 
from Europe and North American to use 
among themselves, while the un model was 
developed specifically with an orientation 
towards developing nations like Uganda. 
The two models have significant common 
provisions, but in general comparative terms, 
the oecd model accords greater weight to 
the residence principal which is favoured 
by the developed countries; while the un 
model leans towards the source principle and 
favours a greater retention of taxing rights by 
the country where the income is sourced, as 
compared to the country where the taxpay-
er is tax resident. This hence explains why 
developing countries prefer the un model 
whose provisions have a lower or no thresh-
old requirement for source country taxation. 
In order to mitigate the effects of internation-
al double taxation, countries normally enter 
into Double Taxation Agreements (dtas) or 
sign tax treaties for the avoidance of double 
taxation on a bilateral basis. The Double Tax 
Treaties generally avoid and reduce the bur-
den of juridical double taxation “in two (or 
more) States on the same taxpayer in respect 
of the same subject matter and for identical 
periods (R.Rohatgi, 2005). 
However, studies have revealed that over 
the years these dtas no longer serve their 
purpose of avoidance of double taxation 
instead they are used as conduits for tax 
avoidance by  Multinational companies 
(mnc) across tax jurisdictions. For instance 
a taxpayer (mncs) get involved in ‘treaty 
shopping’ this term refers to the use of tax 
treaties by the residents of  a non - treaty 
state to obtain treaty benefits that are not 
supposed to be availed to them5. Taxpayers 
engaged in treaty shopping and other treaty 
abuse strategies undermine tax sovereignty 
by claiming treaty benefits in situations, 
where these benefits were not intended to 
be granted, thereby depriving of countries 
of tax revenues6. Treaty shopping is unde-
sirable as it can be used to reduce exposure 
to withholding taxes where a taxpayer wants 
to invest in a country which does not have a 
treaty with his country of residence.
   
The general relationship between a Tax 
Treaty and the Domestic Law is that a term 
defined in a dta takes precedence over a 
similar term in the tax law of a contracting 
state. The terms not defined have a meaning 
which it has under the Tax Law of a con-
tracting state7.
In this respect, Sections 88(1) of Uganda’s 
Income Tax Act articulates that internation-
al agreements between the government of 
Uganda and the government of a foreign 
country shall have effect in response to  the 
agreement that prevails over the provisions 
of the Act to the extent to which the terms 
5 (n.d.). The Improper Use of Tax Treaties - gbv. Retrieved September 21, 2018, from http://www.
gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/272359920.pdf
6 (2015, October 5). Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate - oecd.org. Re-
trieved August 04, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/tax/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-
in-inappropriate-circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report-9789264241695-en.htm
7 (2012, October 19). The Income Tax Act Cap.340 4 - Uganda Revenue Authority. Retrieved Au-
gust 16, 2018, from https://www.ura.go.ug/Resources/webuploads/inlb/dt%20Laws%202014.pdf
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of the agreement are inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Act8. 
As at August 2018, Uganda has 9 (nine) 
treaties in force with countries; Zambia, 
uk, Italy, South Africa, Denmark, Norway, 
Mauritius, India and Netherlands. Uganda is 
also a member of the East African Commu-
nity (eac), the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (coMesa) and both of 
which have model tax treaties. An interview 
done with the Ministry of Finance officials 
September 2014 suggests that, in the treaty 
negotiations, Uganda has generally followed 
the un model tax convention9 (Martin and 
Jalia 2016). As earlier mentioned above, the 
un model is described in its title as a model 
for treaties between developed and develop-
ing countries10.
A research study conducted by seatini 
and ActionAid Uganda in 2014, indicated 
that some of these tax treaties have made 
Uganda vulnerable to treaty abuse and loss 
of revenue.  In the same study, it is also 
mentioned that it has been a long time since 
these treaties were reviewed to put into the 
consideration of the emerging economic 
trends in Uganda such as oil and gas, re-
gional integration, cross-border transactions, 
transfer pricing rules among others. In this 
context, in June 2014, Uganda’s Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Develop-
ment (Mofped) announced the suspension of 
the new treaties negotiations and called for 
a review of its tax treaty network11. This re-
view presents an opportunity for Uganda to 
formulate a clear, evidence-based approach 
to tax treaties, beginning by asking questions 
that African countries seem rarely to have 
posed; what effect do Uganda’s tax treaties 
have on tax revenue12. This leads to the next 
discussion, the factors that give support to 
treaty abuse for the case study of Uganda13.
B.  Factors that give support to  treaty 
abuse in Uganda
2.2.1 Tax treaties with low tax jurisdictions 
-Low or zero tax withholding tax rates
As earlier noted, tax treaties set maximum 
rates at which withholding taxes can be lev-
ied on cross-border payments, especially 
on dividends, interest, royalties and man-
agement or technical service fees. Uganda 
has indeed been successful at maintaining 
the right to levy a withholding tax on man-
agement fees paid to foreign companies, and 
the other withholding taxes have historically 
compared well to those of many other Af-
rican countries (Martin & Jalia, 2016). In 
8 (2012, October 19). The Income Tax Act Cap.340 4 - Uganda Revenue Authority. Retrieved Au-
gust 16, 2018, from https://www.ura.go.ug/Resources/webuploads/inlb/dt%20Laws%202014.pdf
9 (n.d.). A review of Uganda’s tax treaties and recommendations for action. Retrieved September 
21, 2018, from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67868/1/Hearson_A_Review_of_Uganda_Tax.pdf
10 (n.d.). A review of Uganda’s tax treaties and recommendations for action. Retrieved September 
21, 2018, from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67868/1/Hearson_A_Review_of_Uganda_Tax.pdf
11 (2014, June 6). Govt suspends Double Taxation pacts - Daily Monitor. Retrieved August 16, 
2018, from http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Govt-suspends-Double-Taxation-pacts/688322-
2338432-dkw4jwz/index.html
12 (n.d.). A review of Uganda’s tax treaties and recommendations for action. Retrieved August 16, 
2018, from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67868/1/Hearson_A_Review_of_Uganda_Tax.pdf
13 see the next sections 2.2 of this article.
147
Revista de Derecho Fiscal n.º 14 • enero-junio de 2019 • pp. 143-168
oecd’s Action plan on Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (beps); Emphasis on treaty abuse…
Uganda’s  tax code, these payments are all 
taxed at 15%,  however, these tax rates have 
trended down since the first treaty with the 
uk,  and in particular, in the more recent trea-
ties with Uganda - Netherlands Income Tax 
treaty signed in 200414 (wht rate at zero ,  15 
% on dividend, and No wht on Management 
fees, 10% on interest and 10% on  royalties); 
Uganda -Belgium Income Tax treaty signed 
in 2007 (wht rate at 5% on dividend, 10% 
on management fees, 10% on interest 10% 
on royalties); and Uganda and China Income 
Tax treaty signed in 201215 (7.5% on divi-
dend, No wht on management fees, 10% 
on interest, 10% on royalties) (Martin and 
Jalia 2016).  In general, Uganda’s treaties 
set maximum rates that are below the rates 
in its domestic law.  
As a result, this has contributed to tax reve-
nues foregone by Uganda due to the reduced 
dividend and interest withholding tax rates 
as stipulated by these tax treaties. According 
to the International Monetary Fund (imf) 
2014 report, such revenue forgone by Ugan-
da in figures is the Dutch treaty may dwarf 
all others, with a cost of between 22 billion 
and 63 billion shillings per year (around 
us $ 8 Million to us $ 24 Million) and the 
Mauritius treaty comes to close at 2.6 billion 
shillings (about us $ 1 Million) (Martin and 
Jalia 2016).  These figures exclude the cost 
of lower withholding taxes on royalties and 
management fees, where data is not availa-
ble, but which is likely to create significant 
further costs. Furthermore, a Ugandan Fi-
nance Ministry official once expressed that 
“a lot of money was flying out through man-
agement fees” (Martin & Jalia 2016).
More so, a general observation was made 
by A.W. Oguttu 2016 that tax treaties in Af-
rican states that comprise of low-tax jurisdic-
tions can be abused as part of sophisticated 
tax planning to frustrate the legislative tax 
claims of African states.   The major concern 
is the low or zero treaty withholding tax rates 
agreed to in respect of dividends, interest and 
management fees payable by Multinational 
Enterprises (mnes) which are also often used 
for treaty shopping purposes. Most treaty 
shopping schemes in Africa involve compa-
nies registered in Mauritius under the Global 
Business Licence 1 regime16.
Treaty shopping refers to the practice of 
establishing a conduit company in a country 
with a favourable network of tax treaties, and 
usually a low effective tax rate, to take ad-
vantage of the benefits if those treaties rather 
than the less generous terms ( if there is a 
treaty at all) negotiated between the inves-
tors home country rather than the destination 
of their investment (Cooper 2014).
Further evidence in Uganda of signifi-
cant revenue loss due to preventable treaty 
shopping is stipulated by Martin and Jalia, 
14 (2007, July 1). netherlands - uganda income tax treaty ... - Uganda Revenue Authority. Retrie-
ved September 15, 2018, from https://www.ura.go.ug/openFile.do?path=//webupload//upload//
download//staticContent//rgtmenu//458//462_Netherlands-Uganda_dta.pdf
15 (n.d.). agreement. Retrieved September 15, 2018, from http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/
n810770/c1152919/part/1152921.pdf
16 (n.d.). Basic International Taxation Vol I by Roy Rohatgi - The Africa Tax .... Retrieved Sep-
tember 15, 2018, from http://www.africataxjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Basic-
International-Taxation-Vol-I-by-Roy-Rohatgi-eBook.pdf
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2016  as they note that the vast majority if 
investment from the Netherlands into ugan-
da appears not to originate from, given that 
it enables a zero rate on dividends (Martin 
and Jalia, 2016).
Furthermore, according to an interview 
conducted by Martin and Jalia 2016, a Ugan-
da Revenue Authority (ura) official stated 
that  “the ones claiming (reduced taxation) 
under the dtas are many, about one per 
day. The worst culprits are mauritius and 
a lot of companies trading in uganda have 
headquarters in Mauritius”. With Uganda’s 
booming mobile communications and oil, 
gas sector, this has attracted several compa-
nies that have a treaty with Uganda but have 
been structured via third countries with more 
favourable treaties, for example, Bahti Airtel 
is headquartered in India, but its investment 
is structured via the Netherlands, mtn is 
headquartered in South Africa with its in-
vestment structured via Mauritius (Kalinaki 
2014 & mtn Group Plc 2014). 
2.2.2 Tax treaties with low tax jurisdictions 
-Avoidance of capital gains tax 
Uganda levies capital gains tax. The In-
come Tax Act of Uganda states that the in-
come of the immovable property is taxed 
where it is situated and a credit is allowed 
in the country of residence17. The rules of 
immovable property vary from dta to dta.
This article focuses its analysis on the 
Double Taxation Agreement (dta) between 
Uganda and Netherlands. The treaty was 
signed on 31 August 2004 and came into 
force on the 1 January 2007 in the Nether-
lands, and 1 July 2007 in Uganda.  
In this treaty context, Article 13(1) of this 
treaty states that gains derived by a resident 
of a contracting state from the alienation of 
immovable property referred to in Article 
6 and situated in the other contracting state 
may be taxed in that other State18. Article 
13(2) of such treaty gives the source state 
the right to tax capital gains derived from 
a Permanent Establishment (pe) located in 
that state. 
Article 13(3) is a special rule in respect of 
gains derived from the alienation of ships or 
aircraft operated in international traffic or 
movable property pertaining to the operation 
of such ships or aircraft. 
Article 13(4) of this treaty looks at gains 
from the alienation of any property other 
than that referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 
3, shall be taxable only in the Contracting 
State of which the alienator is a resident, 
article 13(5) of this treaty states that Not-
withstanding the provisions of paragraph 4, a 
Contracting State may, in accordance with its 
own laws; including the interpretation of the 
term “alienation”, levy tax on gains derived 
by an individual who is a resident of the oth-
er Contracting State from the alienation of 
shares or “jouissance” shares or “jouissance” 
rights in a company whose capital is divided 
into shares and which, under the laws of the 
17 (2012, October 19). The Income Tax Act Cap.340 4 - Uganda Revenue Authority. Retrieved Au-
gust 16, 2018, from https://www.ura.go.ug/Resources/webuploads/inlb/dt%20Laws%202014.pdf
18 (2007, July 1). netherlands - uganda income tax treaty ... - Uganda Revenue Authority. Retrieved 
August 16, 2018, from https://www.ura.go.ug/openFile.do?path=//webupload//upload//download//
staticContent//rgtmenu//458//462_Netherlands-Uganda_dta.pdf
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first-mentioned Contracting State, is a resi-
dent of that State, and from the alienation of 
part of the rights attached to the said shares 
or rights, if that individual holds shares in the 
issued capital of a particular class of shares 
in that company.
As later will be discussed under sections 
2.3 of this article, some of the anti-avoidance 
rules that Uganda should be incorporated in 
all of its  tax treaties.
In general, most African countries do not 
include some of the anti-avoidance rules 
in their tax treaties. This has led to Multi-
national Enterprises (mnes) incorporating 
conduit companies in low- tax jurisdictions 
like in Mauritius and then later are used to 
dispose-off their shares in assets located in 
an African state so that these sale proceeds 
appear to be derived from such jurisdictions 
hence the avoidance of capital gains tax19. 
There are several mnes in Uganda that 
have changed ownership, sold off their 
shares and the resultant proceeds of this 
disposals have not been taxed by Uganda 
Revenue Authority (ura); the likes of Shell 
Uganda Limited to Vivo Energy, Zain Ugan-
da to Celtel Uganda Limited. This is further 
illustrated well in the case of Celtel Ugan-
da Limited vs Uganda Revenue Authority 
(Civil Appeal No.22 Of 2006, 2010)20. The 
facts of the case was that; specific reference 
is made to a case Zain International bv vs 
the commissioner general of ura, where 
Zain Africa bv sold its shares in Zain Africa 
to Bharti Airtel international. All the three 
companies are incorporated and resident in 
the Netherlands. Zain Africa bv had equi-
ty interests in 26 Dutch companies among 
which was Celtel Uganda holding bv that 
owned 99.99% of Celtel Uganda Ltd.
 
The ura issued assessments arising out 
of a disposal of shares, which were indirect-
ly held by Zain international bv in Celtel 
Uganda ltd. Zain bv applied to court seek-
ing a declaration that the ura lacked juris-
diction to tax since Zain bv was resident in 
the Netherlands. They argued that even if 
taxation was allowed under domestic law, 
under the Netherlands-Uganda tax treaty, 
Uganda had no taxing right (Commissioner 
General ura Vs Zain International bv, 2014; 
Kalinaki, 2014).
The court of appeal ruled that Uganda had 
the jurisdiction to tax citing section 88(5) of 
Uganda’s Income-tax Act, which provides 
that: 
“Where an international agreement pro-
vides that income derived from sources 
in Uganda is exempt from Ugandan tax 
or is subject to a reduction in the rate of 
Ugandan tax, the benefit of that exemption 
or reduction is not available to any person 
who, for the purposes of the agreement, is a 
resident of the other contracting state where 
19 (2016, May 23). Africa/International/oecd - oecd’s Action Plan on Tax Base Erosion .... Re-
trieved August 18, 2018, from https://www.ibfd.org/ibfd-Products/Journal-Articles/Bulletin-for-
International-Taxation/collections/bit/html/bit_2016_06_int_1.html
20 (2011, December 10). zain international bv vs commissioner general and ura. Retrieved 
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50% or more of the underlying ownership 
of that person is held by an individual or 
individuals who are not residents of that 
other Contracting State for the purposes of 
the agreement.” 
This provision deprives Uganda to tax 
gains realised by the foreign investors o sales 
of Uganda - based assets. 
In Uganda’s tax policy changes 2018/2019 
which came in force on the 1st of July 2018, 
there has been an amendment of Sections 79 
of the Income Tax Act  by inserting Sections 
79(ga) that reads ‘derived from a direct or in-
direct changes of ownership by fifty percent 
or more of a person other than an individual, 
a government, a political subdivision of a 
government and a listed institution located 
in Uganda’ 
1.  Abuse of tax sparing provisions in the 
tax treaties
It was noted that treaty shopping is en-
couraged by the tax sparing provisions that 
many Africans countries apply in an effort to 
encourage investors21. A research study con-
ducted by seatini and ActionAid Uganda in 
2014, quotes Uganda’s Minister for Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development Ma-
yanja Nkangi  in 1993 announcing that the 
government would embark on negotiating 
double taxation agreements with identified 
major trading partner. The minister had stat-
ed that the purpose of the treaties was to 
ensure that the effectiveness of current in-
centives is not eroded by the absence of 
complementary tax treaties because in the 
absence of any complementary tax holidays 
with the home countries foreign investors, 
the revenue  foregone by reducing a com-
pany’s tax liability in uganda represents a 
revenue gain by the ministry of finance in 
the home country. 
What could possibly be inclined to such 
reasoning was that by including the tax spar-
ing provisions in a treaty, the treaty partner 
would agree to a credit for taxes due but 
foregone by Uganda due to investment in-
centives, thus ensuring that the benefit from 
the tax incentives accrued to the multina-
tional investors at whom they were targeted. 
Uganda’s legislation makes it forthwise that 
major investment partners’ foreign income 
is exempted from taxation. Hence, the low-
er withholding tax and other restrictions on 
source taxation in uganda’s treaties effec-
tively act as tax incentives, lowering the 
overall cost for firms from these countries 
of investment in Uganda22. 
Martin Hearson and Jalia Kangave (2016) 
in one of their interviews quotes a Ugandan 
government official to have stated that no-
body comes to invest in Uganda because of 
the existence of the tax treaty. Uganda’s sec-
ond biggest source of investments was from 
Australia which has no treaty with Uganda. 
The current new investments in Uganda’s 
oil industry have largely come from French 
21 (2001, July 1). Tax incentives for foreign direct investment - part I : recent trends and .... Re-
trieved August 18, 2018, from https://www.ibfd.org/ibfd-Products/Journal-Articles/Bulletin-for-
International-Taxation/collections/bit/pdf/bifd070101.pdf
22 (n.d.). A Review of Uganda’s Tax Treaties and Recommendations for Action .... Retrieved 
August 18, 2018, from http://www.ictd.ac/publication/a-review-of-uganda-s-tax-treaties-and-
recommendations-for-action/
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company Total, and the Chinese National 
offshore oil corporation and neither based 
countries have a tax treaty with Uganda. 
Later on, in June 2014, Uganda spendended 
all its ongoing treaty negotiations. This im-
plies that the country should have by now be 
asking a question reflected upon by Martin 
Hearson (2014) “How much should Uganda 
constrain it’s right to levy tax now and in the 
future in reference to the current economic 
situation and economic policy”.
 
C.  oecd beps initiative recommendations 
on countering treaty abuse and lessons 
drawn Uganda
The final report on beps Action 6 of 201523 
identifies treaty abuse, and in particular trea-
ty shopping as one of the most important 
beps concerns. Action 6 (prevent treaty 
abuse) describes the work to be undertaken 
in this area. This 2015 final report is organ-
ised into three Sections, Section A included 
anti-abuse provisions that provided safe-
guards against the abuse of treaty provisions, 
Sections B contains revisions to the titles and 
preamble of the oecd Model tax convention 
to clarify that the intention is to eliminate 
double taxation without creating opportu-
nities for non-taxation or reduced taxation 
through tax evasion and avoidance including 
through treaty shopping arrangements, and 
Sections C identifies tax policy considera-
tions relevant to the decision to enter into a 
tax treaty with another country. 
In the final report on Action 6 of 2015, the 
oecd makes recommendations regarding 
the design of domestic rules to prevent the 
granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate 
circumstances. In order to determine the best 
way to prevent the granting of treaty benefits 
in inappropriate circumstances, the oecd 
found it useful to distinguish between two 
types of cases that is; 
- Cases were a person tries to abuse the 
provisions of the domestic laws using 
treaty benefits. oecd Recommends 
that in these cases, treaty shopping 
must be addressed through domestic 
anti abuse rules and;
- Cases where a person tries to cir-
cumvent limitations provided by the 
treaty itself,  the oecd Recommends 
that this should be addressed through 
treaty anti- abuse rules using the fo-
llowing three approaches as explained 
further below; 
The first approach is a clear statement that 
the contracting states, when entering into a 
treaty, wish to prevent tax avoidance and, in 
particular, intend to avoid creating opportu-
nities for treaty shopping will be included 
in tax treaties.
The second approach is a specific an-
ti-abuse rule based on the Limitation On 
Benefits (lob) provisions included in trea-
ties concluded by the United States and a 
few other countries (the lob rule) will be 
23 (2015, October 5). Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate - oecd.org. 
Retrieved September 15, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/tax/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-
benefits-in-inappropriate-circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report-9789264241695-en.htm
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included in the oecd Model. Such a specif-
ic rule will address a large number of treaty 
shopping situations based on the legal na-
ture, ownership in and general activities of 
the residents of a contracting states.
The third approach addresses other forms 
of treaty abuse, including treaty shopping 
situations that would not be covered by the 
lob rule (such as certain conduit financing 
arrangements), tax treaties should include a 
more general anti-abuse rule based on the 
Principal Purpose Test (ppt) rule. This rule 
is intended to provide the clear statement 
that the contracting states intend to deny the 
application of the provisions of their tax trea-
ties when transactions or arrangements are 
entered into to obtain the benefits of those 
provisions in inappropriate circumstances.
The oecd acknowledges that both the 
lob and ppt rules each have strength and 
weaknesses and may not be appropriate for 
all countries. The oecd further advises that 
these rules may be adapted to specificities of 
individual countries and the circumstances 
of the negotiation of tax treaties. For in-
stance, some countries may have domestic 
anti-abuse rules, or the courts of some coun-
tries may have developed various interpre-
tative tools that effectively address various 
forms of domestic law and treaty abuses, and 
these countries might not require the general 
treaty anti-abuse provision.
The oecd recommends at a minimum; 
however, countries should agree to include 
in their tax treaties an express statement 
that their intention is to eliminate double 
taxation without creating opportunities for 
non-taxation or reduced taxation through 
tax evasion or avoidance, including through 
treaty shopping arrangements. oecd report 
further mentions that this intention could be 
implemented by either,
● using the combined lob and ppt ap-
proaches earlier described in this sec-
tion,
● the inclusion of the ppt rule, or
● the inclusion of the lob rule, supple-
mented by a mechanism, such as res-
tricted ppt rule for conduit financing 
arrangements or domestic anti-abuse 
rules or judicial doctrines that would 
realise a similar result that would coun-
ter conduit arrangements that were not 
already dealt with in the tax treaties.
The Discussion Draft on Action 6 of 2014 
describes the terms of  lob provisions and 
these  include, 
● A resident of a contracting state should 
not be entitled to treaty benefits unless 
it is a qualified person, which is defi-
ned by reference to the nature or attri-
butes of various categories of persons.
● A person is entitled to the benefits of 
the tax treaty, even if it is not a quali-
fied person if, subject to certain excep-
tions, the relevant income is derived 
in connection with the active conduct 
of a trade or business in that person’s 
residence state. This derivative bene-
fits test permits certain entities owned 
by the residents of other states to ob-
tain treaty benefits that these residents 
would have obtained had they invested 
directly.
● The discretionary relief in that, even 
if a taxpayer does not qualify for tax 
benefits, the taxpayer may request to 
be treated as a qualified person. In this 
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case, the competent authority of a con-
tracting state may grant treaty benefits 
where the other provisions of the lob 
provision would otherwise deny these 
benefits.
Essentially, the lob provision requires that 
treaty benefits, such as reduced withholding 
rates, are available only to persons that meet 
the specific tests of having some genuine 
presence in the treaty state. 
For african countries to effectively en-
counter treaty shopping, it is important that 
the correct provisions, depending on the 
specific circumstances, are enacted. In prin-
ciple, African countries should ensure that 
the preamble to future tax treaties that they 
negotiate or older tax treaties that they re-
negotiate should refer to the fact that the 
purpose of the tax treaty is not to give rise 
to opportunities for non-taxation or reduced 
taxation by way of tax evasion or avoidance, 
including through treaty shopping.
It should be noted that some African states 
like Uganda, show a limited form of lob 
provisions in their domestic tax laws. In 
particular Section 88(5) of the Ugandan In-
come Tax Act (Chapter 340) states that the 
benefits of a tax treaty are not available to a 
resident enterprise in a partner state where 
50% or more of the underlying ownership 
of that enterprise in a partner state is con-
trolled by individuals who are not resident 
in the partner state. The application of this 
domestic provision to a tax treaty, where 
there is no such provision in the tax treaty, 
may give rise to disputes as sections 88(2) 
of the Uganda Income Tax Act clearly pro-
vides that international agreement entered 
into by the government of Uganda with any 
foreign state prevails over the provisions of 
the Uganda income tax Act.  In this respect, 
imf24 advises that if developing countries 
adopt  lob provision in their domestic law, 
they should also adopt the provision in their 
tax treaty to prevent concerns regarding trea-
ty override arising.
In the similar respect, the new amend-
ments of Uganda’s Income tax that were ef-
fective July 2016 substituted Sections 88(5) 
of Uganda’s Income Tax Act and now reads; 
Except for a public listed company, where 
an international agreement concluded by 
the government of Uganda with another 
contracting state provides that incomes de-
rived by a person resident in such other 
contracting  state from sources in uganda 
is exempt from ugandan tax or is subject to 
a reduction in the rate of, ugandan tax, the 
benefit of that exemption or reduction shall 
not be available to any person who; 
a) receives the income in capacity which is 
other than that of a beneficial owner , within 
the meaning accorded to that term by the 
relevant international agreement, and who 
does not have full and unrestricted ability 
to enjoy that income and to determine its 
future use and; 
b) does not possess economic substance in 
the country of residence.
24 (n.d.). imf -- International Monetary Fund Home .... Retrieved September 21, 2018, from http://
www.imf.org/
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ppt rule, as earlier stated above , the mini-
mum standard to protect against treaty shop-
ping was the  inclusion in the tax treaties a 
ppt rule alone or a ppt rule in conjunction 
with an lob rule. The use of a ppt test as a 
general measure to counter treaty shopping, 
this could be possible for african countries, 
especially those that do not have the general 
anti-avoidance rule (gaars) that could ser-
ve a similar purpose. In this regards , Ghana 
has a gaar under Sections 34 of the income 
tax act 896 of 2015 which clearly defines 
tax avoidance to include any arrangement 
whose main purpose is to reduce or avoid 
tax liability25. 
The greatest influence of the treaty ppt test 
is seen in the United Kingdom, where it re-
quires that treaty benefits are denied if one of 
the principal purposes of the transaction is to 
avoid taxation by taking advantage of treaty 
benefits. In addition, Netherlands over the 
last two years has changed its treaty policy 
with regards to developing countries, which 
revealed a proactive approach to use ppt to 
counter treaty abuse. The Netherlands has 
also renegotiated tax treaties with 23 other 
developing countries among which include 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Zambia, each of 
which contains a ppt anti-abuse provision26.
It should, however, be noted that the tests 
such as the ppt rule which rely upon the 
concepts of purpose and intention are nor-
mally difficult for tax administrations to ad-
minister and for taxpayers to comply with, 
as they require proof of intent. It is on this 
note that African countries should rely on the 
lob provisions to counter the abuse of tax 
treaties. Furthermore, the oecd recommends 
african countries for the use of two specific 
anti- abuse provisions in regards to certain 
types of income that is should; 
a. Ensure that tax treaties they conclude 
contain the equivalent of article 17(2) 
of the both the oecd and un Model, 
which is aimed at personal service 
companies used by entertainers and 
athletes to avoid source state taxation; 
b. Include the equivalent of article 13(4) 
of the oecd model in the tax treaties 
that they conclude, which allows states 
to tax gains derived from the sale of 
shares in real estate holding companies 
to counter the use of such companies in 
avoiding taxation of gains on the un-
derlying real estate. In this regards, If 
Uganda had had such provision in the 
netherlands Uganda Income tax treaty 
(2004), it would have had a clear cut 
claim in Zain International bv (2011). 
For African countries that wish to expand 
their treaty networks, but are not sure of 
whether to conclude a tax treaty or termi-
nate the abusive tax treaties that are in place, 
the oecd beps initiatives has identified tax 
policy considerations that states should con-
sider before deciding to conclude a tax treaty 
with a given state or to terminate a tax trea- 
ty if changes to the domestic law of a treaty 
25 (n.d.). income tax act, 2015 act 896 - gra. Retrieved September 17, 2018, from http://www.gra.
gov.gh/docs/info/dtrd/income%20tax%20act%202015%20(act%20896).pdf
26 (2015, June 23). Netherlands renegotiates tax treaties with developing nations to add .... Retrie-
ved September 16, 2018, from https://mnetax.com/netherlands-renegotiates-tax-treaties-ethiopia-
ghana-kenya-zambia-to-add-antiabuse-clause-hopes-add-clause-23-treaties-9530
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partner raise concerns regarding those base 
erosion and profit shifting oecd.  The oecd, 
however, recognises that there may be non-
tax factors that can result in the conclusion 
of a tax treaty and that each country has a 
sovereign right to decide to conclude a tax 
treaty with any country with which it decides 
to do so. 
In 2014, Uganda announced that it had 
suspended all its ongoing treaty negotiations 
pending a review of the treaty terms that it 
should seek in such negotiations27. This gives 
Uganda a good opportunity to re-evaluate all 
its tax treaties concluded to determine those 
that give rise to risks of base erosion and 
profit shifting and especially those that lack 
anti-abuse provisions, those with zero or 
low withholding tax rates and those that are 
open-ended tax sparing provisions28. Such 
tax treaties should be renegotiated to ensure 
an improved redistribution of taxing rights. 
Taking into account of the cost, and the 
time involved in such negotiations, African 
countries like Uganda may have to consider 
to adhering to the Multilateral Instrument 
proposed by the oecd under Action 15 (this 
will be discussed in detail under Sections 4 
of this article). 
In summary,  the key issues that Uganda 
can draw from this beps Action  6: Prevent 
treaty abuse is;
● To have the general anti-avoidance rule 
(gaars) in their domestic provisions 
like it’s for the case of Ghana and many 
other countries. Moreso, these gaars 
should be well aligned with the re-
commended treaty ppt rule so that the 
possibility of any conflict is removed.
● To reevaluate all its tax treaties con-
cluded to determine those that give 
rise to risks of base erosion and profit 
shifting and especially those that lack 
anti-abuse provisions, those with ze-
ro or no wht rates and those that are 
open-ended tax sparing provisions.
II.  Beps Action 7: Prevent artificial 
avoidance of the Permanent 
Establishment (pe) Status
In September 2017, oecd issued a public 
discussion draft titled Additional guidance 
on attribution of profits to Permanent Estab-
lishments (Discussion Draft) that mandated 
the development of changes to the definition 
of ‘Permanent Establishment’ (‘pe’) in ar-
ticle 5 of the oecd Model Tax Convention 
(‘mtc’) to prevent the artificial avoidance 
of pe status through the use of commission-
aire arrangements to avoid Article 5(5), and 
through reliance on the specific activity ex-
emptions of Article 5(4).
The question of whether or not a pe exists 
in a country is a common tax treaty issue that 
most tax authorities must deal with when 
examining International Taxation matters. 
Under virtually all bilateral tax treaties, busi-
ness profits earned by the resident of one 
27 (2014, June 6). Govt suspends Double Taxation pacts - Daily Monitor. Retrieved September 16, 
2018, from http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Govt-suspends-Double-Taxation-pacts/688322-
2338432-dkw4jwz/index.html
28 (n.d.). A review of Uganda’s tax treaties and recommendations for action. Retrieved September 
16, 2018, from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67868/1/Hearson_A_Review_of_Uganda_Tax.pdf
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country are taxable in the other source coun-
try only if the business is carried on through 
a pe located in that other country and the 
profits attributable to the pe, for example, the 
requirement for a pe is a minimum threshold 
that must be satisfied before a source country 
ca tax residents of the other treaty country 
on their business profits derived from that 
country29. It’s important for countries to be 
aware of the differences in the definition of 
a pe as per the oecd and un model. 
The oecd model defines a pe as a fixed 
place of business through which the business 
of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried 
on, and includes a place of management, 
branch, office, factory, workshop, mine, 
well, quarry; as well as building sites and 
construction or installation projects which 
last for more than a given number of months. 
The oecd model provides a twelve month 
test period for building or construction sites, 
while the un model provides for a six months 
test period and extends the definition to cov-
er assembly projects, as well as supervisory 
activities in connection with building sites 
and construction, assembly or installation 
projects. The un model also adds the fur-
nishing of services by an enterprise through 
employees or other personnel as constituting 
a pe if such activities continue for a total of 
more than 183 days in any twelve-month 
period commencing or ending in the relevant 
fiscal year. There general exceptions of this 
rule of the amount of time for services like 
shipping and air transport, it is argued that 
the provisions of services should be treated 
the same way as other business activities 
and therefore constitutes a pe for purposes 
of a dta. 
This article also  looks at the oecd beps 
initiatives to counter avoidance of a pe status 
and also give a highlight of what Uganda 
domestic tax laws can draw these initiatives.
In Uganda’s domestic tax laws, pe defi-
nition does not differ much from the un 
model definition. Under the Income Tax Act 
of Uganda, a branch is defined as; a taxable 
entity to mean (a) permanent establishment, 
in the case of a treaty signed between Ugan-
da and another country; or (b) a definition 
found in section 78 of the Income tax act.
This Section 78 of Uganda’s Income Tax 
Act defines a branch to mean
 
A place where a person carries on business 
and includes; A place where a person carries 
on business through an agent, other that a 
general agent of independent status acting 
in the ordinary course of business as such; 
A place where a person has , is using or is 
installing substantial equipment or substan-
tial machinery for ninety days or more; or 
A place where person is engaged in a cons-
truction, assembly or installation project for 
90 days or more , including a place where a 
person is conducting a supervisory activities 
in relation to such a project;’
The oecd noted that the concept of a pe 
has been subjected to criticism from both 
mnes that abuse it by compartmentalising it 
and developing countries that wish to extend 
it so as to reclaim their tax jurisdiction. The 
29 (n.d.). Taxation of Income & Consumption in Uganda: the law and practice. Retrieved August 
25, 2018, from http://catalogue.library.ucu.ac.ug/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=46514
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oecd also acknowledges that the current 
pe definition is insufficient to address base 
erosion and profit shifting strategies in the 
changing international environment, as its 
standards are ineffective in equably allocat-
ing taxing rights between source states and 
the residence states30. In general, the oecd’s 
approach to addressing the base erosion and 
profit shifting concerns regarding pe is lim-
ited to; the concept of a pe which is largely 
based on physical presence in a state not put-
ting in consideration of the existence of elec-
tronic business models where transactions 
can be carried out without physical presence, 
Article 7(2) of the oecd Model upholds the 
separate legal entity principle even though 
the current modern mnes often operate as a 
single unified enterprises that are managed 
from a central location by managers who are 
responsible for the enterprise as a whole31.
It has been widely reported that Multi-
national Enterprises (mnes) have found it 
simple to avoid the creation of pe due to 
the narrow definition of a pe contained in 
the existing tax treaties in Uganda. Take an 
example of the dta between Uganda and 
Netherlands, the treaty in the pe definition, 
it excludes activities of a pe which are ‘pre-
paratory or auxiliary nature’, activities of 
storage or display of goods or merchandise 
and activities which involve ‘collecting in-
formation’ from taxation, among others. This 
hence restricts the amount of taxes that can 
be collected such pes whose activities are 
excluded in the pe definition.
Uganda’s economy is currently under-
taking oil exploration activities which has 
attracted several mnes from Netherlands and 
Denmark among others. The current concern 
in Uganda is on the taxation of these oil ex-
ploration activities. The treaty signed with 
Uganda and Netherlands include a special 
oil exploration pe to tax the profits from 
such activities, the threshold for which is a 
minimum presence in the country of thirty 
days. However, the risk here is that these oil 
service providers will always structure to 
avoid pe risk or status. 
The two weakness identified in pe defini-
tion with in Uganda’s tax treaties; 
1. Firstly,  the absence from most of them 
of the un service pe provision, which 
expands the pe threshold to encompass 
service providers who are physically 
present in the country but do not ope-
rate from a ‘fixed base’;
2. Secondly, the weakness is in the length 
of time a construction site must be in 
place before it meets the pe defini-
tion that is six months construction 
however some chinese companies have 
proved that they can do things in three 
months ( lesser period) (Martin and 
Jalia 2016). 
30 (2017, September 15). Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (beps) beps Action 7 ... - oecd.org. 
Retrieved August 25, 2018, from https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/Compilation-public-
comments-attribution-profits-to-permanent-establishments-2017.pdf
31 (n.d.). Source versus Residence - All Arts Belastingadviseurs. Retrieved August 25, 2018, from 
http://www.allarts.nl/filelib/file/vienna-sofc-sandlermolenaar.pdf
158
Revista de Derecho Fiscal n.º 14 • enero-junio de 2019 • pp. 143-168
Busingye Agnes
A.  oecd beps initiatives to counter 
avoidance of the pe status and lessons 
drawn Uganda
3.1.1 Countering avoidance of the status of 
a pe using commissionaire arrangement
The beps Action 7; 2015 Final report 
loosely defines A commissionaire arrange-
ment as an arrangement through which a per-
son sells products in a given State in its own 
name but on behalf of a foreign enterprise 
that is the owner of these products. Through 
such an arrangement, a foreign enterprise 
is able to sell its products in a State without 
having a permanent establishment to which 
such sales may be attributed for tax purpos-
es; since the person that concludes the sales 
does not own the products that it sells, it 
cannot be taxed on the profits derived from 
such sales and may only be taxed on the 
remuneration that it receives for its services 
(usually a commission). 
These commissionaire arrangements have 
been a major preoccupation of tax admin-
istrations in many countries, as shown by 
a number of cases dealing with such ar-
rangements that are litigated in the oecd 
countries. In most of the cases that went 
to court, according to beps Action 7; 2015 
Final report, the tax administration’s argu-
ments were rejected.
The October 2014 beps public discussion 
draft indicated that changes were needed to 
the wording of Art. 5(5) and 5(6) of the oecd 
Model in order to address commissionaire 
structures and similar arrangements. As a 
matter of policy, where the activities that 
an intermediary exercises in a country are 
intended to result in the regular conclusion 
of contracts to be performed by a foreign 
enterprise, that enterprise should be con-
sidered to have a sufficient taxable nexus 
in that country unless the intermediary is 
performing these activities in the course of 
an independent business32.  Furthermore, the 
report on Action 7 recommends that;  article 
5(5) be amended to provide that, subject to 
Article 5(6), an enterprise has a pe in a con-
tracting state where a person acts in that state 
on behalf of the enterprise ‘ and , in doing so, 
habitually concludes contracts, or habitually 
plays a principal role leading to the conclu-
sion of contracts that are routinely concluded 
without material modification by the enter-
prise,’ and the contracts are neither in the 
name of the enterprise, or for the transfer 
of goods or services by the enterprise; and 
article 5(6) to be  amended to provide that, 
although a pe will not be deemed to exist 
under article 5(5) if the person acting in a 
contracting state for the enterprise is doing 
so in the ordinary course of its business as 
an independent agent, a person will not be 
considered to be an independent agent if it 
acts ‘exclusively or almost exclusively on 
behalf if one or more enterprises to which it 
is closely related’33.  
32 (2015, October 5). Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status .... 
Retrieved September 21, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/ctp/preventing-the-artificial-avoidance-
of-permanent-establishment-status-action-7-2015-final-report-9789264241220-en.htm
33 (2017, September 15). beps Action 7 Additional Guidance on Attribution of Profits to .... Re-
trieved August 30, 2018, from https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/beps-discussion-draft-
additional-guidance-attribution-of-profits-to-permanent-establishments.pdf
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In the same report, oecd recommends that, 
as a matter of policy, where the activities 
that an intermediary exercises in a state are 
intended to result in the regular conclusion 
of contacts to be performed by the foreign 
enterprise, that enterprise should be consid-
ered to have a taxable presence in that state, 
unless the intermediary performs the activi-
ties in the course of an independent business. 
3.1.2 Splitting of contracts by contractors 
to circumvent pe time limits
Article 5(3) of the oecd model provides 
for a special pe rule for construction , instal-
lation projects and building sites that last for 
more than 12 months period. In the action 7( 
2015 final report), It has been cited out that 
the twelve months threshold has given rise 
to abuses; it has sometimes been found that 
enterprises (maily contractors or subcon-
tractors working on the continental shelf or 
engaged in activities connected with explo-
ration and exploitation of the continental 
shelf) divided their contracts up into several 
parts, each covering a period less than twelve 
months and attributed to a different company 
which was , however, owned by the same 
group. In order to address these concerns, 
article 5 of the oecd Model (2014) recom-
mends that such abuses can be countered by 
the application of the legislative or judicial 
anti- avoidance rules, countries concerned 
with this issue can adopt solutions in the 
framework of bilateral negotiations.
Article 5(3) of the un models differs from 
the oecd model in that us covers not only 
building sites, construction and installation 
projects  which are covered in article 5(3) 
of the oecd model, but also ‘ assembly pro-
jects or supervisory activities in connection 
therewith’. The time limit  to avoid pe status 
is also restricted in the un Model, in that 
such projects or activities constitute a pe if 
they last more than six months, in contract 
to the 12- months time limit in the oecd 
model. Uganda’s tax treaties concluded with 
Mauritius, the netherlands, south africa and 
United Kingdom follow the un model. How-
ever it would be better for Uganda to ne-
gotiate shorter time limits considering that 
some construction activities undertaken by 
chinese companies can be completed in a 
shorter period of three months Hearson and 
Jalia (2016).  
3.1.3 Splitting of service contacts to avoid 
the status of pe
The exception in Article 5(3), which ap-
plies to construction sites, has given rise 
to abuses through the practice of splitting 
up contacts between closely related enter-
prises34.
The issue of splitting service contracts is 
a big concern in african countries.  Multina-
tional enterprises mnes who engage in  such 
services activities  of  the provision of the 
services of engineers or consultants  often 
argue that their activities are of a temporary 
nature hence tend to avoid the status of pe. 
This is so in cases by mnes if an enterprise 
fragraments its activities amony related en-
34 (2015, October 5). Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status .... 
Retrieved September 14, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/ctp/preventing-the-artificial-avoidance-
of-permanent-establishment-status-action-7-2015-final-report-9789264241220-en.htm
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terprises of if it uses related non resident 
enterprises to carry out connected projects. 
 
The commentary on Article 5 of the oecd 
Model 2014 recommends that legislative or 
judicial anti avoidance rules be applied to 
counter such abuses. The commentary on 
Article 5 also suggests an alternative Service 
pe provision that states may include  in their 
tax treaties.
As earlier seen most Uganda tax treaties 
were conclude based on provisions of Article 
5 (3)(b) of the un model , which sets out a 
special pe service provision that covers the 
furnishing of services, including consultancy 
services, by an enterprise of a contracting 
state through employees or other personnel 
engaged by the enterprise if those activities 
continue, on the same or connected project, 
for an aggregate period of more than 183 
days in any 12 months period. However the 
effectiveness of the provisions of Article 5 
(3) (b) of the un model depends on whether 
tax authorities can detect the presence of the 
service provider for more than 183 days in 
the relevant state. This 183 days time limit 
can easily be manipulated. 
In Uganda right now, several audits have 
been done on some of these  mnes who 
recruit foreign specialists in the field of tel-
ecom oil and gas sectors and at the end of 
their short term contracts (the 183 days time 
limit), these specialists (employees) are not 
taxed on incomes earned in Uganda. When 
the tax authority Uganda Revenue Author-
ity (ura) issued  Additional assessments 
on these mnes as they had an obligation 
to withhold from these employees, instead 
they made appeals to Uganda’s Tax Appeal 
Tribunal (tat). Todate there is no decided 
case in Uganda’s tat on the 183 days limit to 
set precedence for other future cases on the 
matter. Much as audits have been done in this 
regards, no tax revenues are have yet been 
yielded on this matter (no data documented). 
This clearly shows that the 183 days limit 
can easily be manipulated.
In seatini  Uganda report,  a recommen-
dation was made that Uganda’s dtas negoti-
ated should adopt a shorter period in order to 
collect tax from persons who might source a 
lot of income from Uganda with in a period 
less than 90 days and move back to their ju-
risdictions without paying taxes in Uganda. 
Its is evident that uganda has made steps to 
negotiate time limits that are less than 183 
days. This is evident in the tax treaties Mau-
ritius and uganda income tax treaty (2003)35, 
Netherlands and Uganda Income tax treaty 
(2004)36 provides for a four-month time limit 
with regard to the furnishing services.
Even through article 5(3)(b) of the un 
model can be helpful in preventing splitting 
of service contracts in that services for the 
same or connected service provider are ag-
gregated within counting the number of days 
that the services are performed in the source 
country, there still abuses since the provision 
does not take in account services provided by 
35 (2003, September 19). ibfd - mauritius - uganda income tax treaty - Uganda Revenue Authori-
ty. Retrieved September 14, 2018, from https://www.ura.go.ug/openFile.do?path=//webupload//
upload//download//staticContent//rgtmenu//458//461_Mauritius_dta.pdf
36 (2007, July 1). netherlands - uganda income tax treaty ... - Uganda Revenue Authority. Retrie-
ved September 14, 2018, from https://www.ura.go.ug/openFile.do?path=//webupload//upload//
download//staticContent//rgtmenu//458//462_Netherlands-Uganda_dta.pdf
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related enterprises with respect to the same 
or connected projects37. There manys cases 
in Uganda where mnes in uganda are a sub-
sidiary to a parent company based in other 
jurisdictions  and this parent company offer 
or provide services such as legal, informa-
tion technology,recruitment, management, 
technical services to this subsidiary in ugan-
da and in most cases these services do not 
require the parents employees to be present 
in uganda for a long period of time. This 
leaves the tax authority to tax Withholding 
tax (wht) on only payments made by the 
Uganda subsidiary to the parent company 
( as per the ugandan domestic law, wht is 
only on payments made). However in most 
cases these subsidiary present in their books 
of accounts that they have never made pay-
ments to the parent company for the services 
offered hence no withholding tax will apply 
for this case. It’s also difficult for the tax 
authority to know or ascertain that these sub-
sidiaries have made payments to the parent 
companies as these subsidiaries will keep 
reporting accruals in regards to the services 
offered by the parent companies. In order to 
prevent such abuses, this calls for effective 
exchange of information on such related 
enterprises  by the tax administration of the 
relevant countries.
In order to address the abuse of the status 
of  a pe when contracts are split between 
closely related enterprises, the oecd beps Fi-
nal Report on Action 7 of 2015 recommends 
that the Principal Purpose Test (ppt) rule (as 
explained earlier in detail under section 2 
of this article), which will be added to the 
oecd Model following the adoption of the 
oecd Report on preventing treaty abuse (see 
sections 2 of this article), should address the 
beps concern related to such abuses.
It should however be noted that Article 4, 
of the oecd model, makes exclusions in the 
pe definition and  these include; 
a) The use of facilities solely for the pur-
pose of storage, display or delivery of 
goods or merchandise belonging to the 
enterprise;
b) The maintenance of stock of goods or 
merchandise belonging to the enter-
prise solely for the purpose of storage, 
display or delivery;
c) The maintenance of the stock of goods 
or merchandise belonging to the enter-
prise solely for the purpose of proces-
sing by another enterprise;
d) The maintenance of a fixed place of 
business solely for the purpose of pur-
chasing goods or merchandise or co-
llecting information, for the enterprise;
e) The maintenance of the a fixed place of 
business solely for the purpose of ca-
rrying on, for the enterprise, any other 
activity;
f) The maintenance of the a fixed place of 
business solely for any combination of 
activities mentioned in subparagraphs 
a) to e).
In this respect, the artificial avoidance of 
pe- excluded activities have not been dis-
cussed in details in this article.
37 (n.d.). Tax base erosion and profit shifting - part 2 : a critique of som .... Retrieved September 
14, 2018, from https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/sabinet/cilsa/2016/00000049/00000001/
art00006
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Uganda has lessons to draw from beps 
Action 7: Prevent artificial avoidance of the 
Permanent Establishment (pe) Status. Ac-
cording to Martin Hearson and Jalia kangave 
(2016), Uganda’s domestic Law  definition 
of  a pe appears to be based on model tax 
treaties, but compared with the laundry list 
that the model treaties on what constitutes a 
pe, Uganda’s domestic definition is actually 
much narrower . There is a strong need for 
Uganda’s domestic tax laws  to incorporate 
for example  the new provisions of  pe defi-
nition;
● to widen the definition of a branch as 
stated under Sections 78  of the Income 
tax Act  rather than modelling it on the 
tax treaty permanent establishments 
provision at all;
● to take in consideration of the 90 - day 
or lower period for construction sites 
and service pes.
● For splitting of contacts, Uganda’s do-
mestic provisions should constitute the 
ppt rule. 
III.  Beps Action 15: Development 
of Multilateral Instruments (MLi) to 
modify Bilateral Tax Treaty
The oecd / G20 beps Action 15 provides 
for development of a Multilateral Instrument 
(mli) to modify bilateral tax treaties. This 
Action 15 deliverables span three different 
areas: recommendations for domestic law 
taking the form of best practices and mod-
el domestic rules, other reports, as well as 
changes to the oecd Model Tax Conven-
tion and internationally agreed guidance on 
Implementation. The main objective of a 
multilateral instrument would be to modify 
existing bilateral tax treaties, in synchro-
nized and efficient manner, to implement 
treaty measures developed in the course of 
the beps project, without a need to individu-
ally renegotiate each treaty with in the 3000+ 
treaty networks oecd, 2014 report38. 
The mli provides a number of benefits to 
mention a few; an innovative approach to ad-
dress the rapidly evolving nature if the global 
economy and the need to adapt international 
rules quickly:  will produce synchronised re-
sults that would save resources and improve 
clarity if beps- related international tax trea-
ty rules: and the mli will avail an opportunity 
for  developing countries to fully benefit 
from the beps project. For developing coun-
tries, the practical problems are encountered 
when addressing beps project from within 
the bilateral tax treaty system alone and more 
so  they find it more difficult to conclude 
double tax treaties, to interest other coun-
tries in tax treaty negotiation, and their tax 
treaty expertise is often more limited. The 
multilateral instrument therefore offers the 
best opportunity to ensure developing coun-
tries reap the benefits of multilateral efforts 
to tackle beps: Furthermore the report out 
that some of the measures developed in the 
beps projects are multilateral in nature and 
some of the provisions would be much more 
effective if implemented through a multilat-
eral instruments.
38 (2015, October 5). Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral ... - oecd.org. Re-
trieved September 3, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/tax/developing-a-multilateral-instrument-
to-modify-bilateral-tax-treaties-action-15-2015-final-report-9789264241688-en.htm
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In a general overview, the mli consists of 
a preamble and seven parts that contain 39 
Articles; Part I (Articles 1 to 2) provides for 
guidance on the scope and interpretation of 
the terms, Part ii to vi ( Articles 3 to 26) deal 
with the  modifications to be made to the 
covered tax treaties and Part vii (Article 27 
to 39) contains the provisions of the instru-
ment which notably lays out implementation 
process, describes the signatures and ratifi-
cation procedure, lists the provisions that 
may be subject to reservation, and affirms 
the entry into force and into effect of the 
provisions of the mli.
This article aims to give an insight on what 
an mli is all about, what modifications to be 
made to the covered tax treaties, and  assess 
whether Uganda should or should not sign 
the mli and how the mli will change the tax 
treaty of Uganda in future. 
A. The Minimum Standard Provisions
beps Actions 6 and 14 include minimum 
standard tax treaty- related measures which 
have been incorporated in the mli under 
Parts iii and V and from which the signa-
tories may opt in and opt out in limited cir-
cumstances. oecd, 2014 report  states that 
the mli is expected to cover the tax treaty 
measures developed in the course of the 
oecd beps Project. These treaty measures 
that are expected to be covered the following 
beps Minimum Standards include;
● The beps Action 6 (Preventing the 
Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inap-
propriate Circumstances) include two 
minimum standard which requires 
the adoption of rules in bilateral tax 
treaties that effectively address treaty 
shopping. Namely;
First,  Article 6 (1) requires countries to 
include in their tax treaties a clear statement, 
that the States that enter into a tax treaty 
intend to avoid creating opportunities for 
non-taxation or reduced taxation through 
tax evasion or avoidance, including through 
treaty- shopping arrangements.
Second, Article 7 requires countries to 
incorporate in the tax treaties a mechanism 
preventing treaty abuse satisfying the min-
imum standard with the implementation 
of either, a (i) a combination of a ’Limita-
tion-On-Benefits’ (lob) rule and a ‘Principal 
Purpose Test’ (ppt) rule; (2) a ppt rule, or (3) 
a lob rule supplemented by a mechanism 
that deals with conduit arrangements, such 
as a restricted ppt rule applicable to conduit 
financing arrangements in which an entity 
otherwise entitled to treaty benefits acts 
as a conduit for payments to third-country 
investors.
B. Non - minimum standard provisions
Other provisions contained in Parts ii to 
vi of the mli do not  constitute minimum 
standards, this means that signatories have 
more flexibility in their implementation, as 
they may discretionarily opt out of these pro-
visions or opt into these provisions.  These 
provisions under mli are as follows;
● Articles 3 to 5 of Part ii deal with hy-
brid mismatches resulting from the 
final report beps Action 2.
● Articles 8 to 11 of Part iii provides 
measures related to the prevention of 
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treaty abuse which were not characteri-
sed as a minimum standard in the Final 
Report on beps Action 6
● Articles 12 to 15 of Part iv  deal with 
Permanent Establishments measures 
resulting from the final report of beps 
Action 7, which seeks to amend exis-
ting tax treaties to counter the artificial 
avoidance of Permanent Establish-
ments status through; commissionaire 
arrangements  and similar strategies 
(Article 12 of the mli), specify activity 
exemptions (Article 13 of the mli), and 
splitting-up of contracts (Article 14 of 
the mli). Article 15 of the mli provides 
a definition of the new notion of ‘Per-
son closely Related to an Enterprise’.
● Article 17 of Part V provides a me-
chanism for signatories to implement 
a corresponding adjustments mecha-
nism in the Mutual Agreement Proce-
dure (map) article of their covered Tax 
Agreement.
● Articles 18 to 26 of Part vi provides for 
mandatory binding arbitration of the 
Mutual Agreement Procedure cases in 
which the content authorities are una-
ble to reach agreement within a fixed 
period of time. This development was 
announced in the final report beps Ac-
tion 14.
In the next discussion, will look at how the 
mli works sections 4.3 of this article, 
C. How the mli works
In November 2016, over 100 jurisdictions 
concluded negotiations on the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Relat-
ed Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (“Multilateral Instrument” 
or “mli”)  that will swiftly implement a se-
ries of tax treaty measures to update interna-
tional tax rules and lessen the opportunity for 
tax avoidance by multinational enterprises. 
The mli already covers over 75 jurisdictions 
and will enter into force on 1st July 2018. 
Signatories include jurisdictions from all 
continents and all levels of development. A 
number of jurisdictions have also expressed 
their intention to sign the mli as soon as pos-
sible and other jurisdictions are also actively 
working towards signature39.
The oecd shared information on how the 
mli will work and  the steps for countries to 
follow in the the application process of the 
multilateral instrument40. The oecd further 
offers a five - step approach to taxpayers, tax 
authorities and tax court to assess whether a 
given provision in a given existing tax treaty 
may be impacted by the mli, a further step 
will consist of interpreting the so impacted 
provision41. 
The mli offers concrete solutions for gov-
ernments to close the gaps in existing inter-
national tax rules by transposing results from 
39 (n.d.). Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related ... - oecd.org. Retrieved Sept-
ember 8, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-
treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.htm
40 (n.d.). Applying the multilateral instrument Step-by-Step - oecd.org. Retrieved September 
8, 2018, from https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/step-by-step-tool-on-the-application-of-the-mli.
pdf
41 (n.d.). Applying the multilateral instrument Step-by-Step - oecd.org. Retrieved Sept-
ember 11, 2018, from https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/step-by-step-tool-on-the-application-
of-the-mli.pdf
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the oecd/G20 beps Project into bilateral tax 
treaties worldwide. The mli modifies the ap-
plication of thousands of bilateral tax treaties 
concluded to eliminate double taxation. It 
also implements agreed minimum stand-
ards to counter treaty abuse and to improve 
dispute resolution mechanisms while pro-
viding flexibility to accommodate specific 
tax treaty policies42. The mli is still open for 
additional Signatories and the jurisdictions 
interested in signing the mli are invited to 
contact the oecd Secretariat.
It should be noted that the entry of the mli 
is considered at;
(1) The level of the mli itself ; Article 34 
of the mli states that the mli’s provi-
sions will enter into force only upon 
ratification under domestic law of the 
mli by at least five signatories. Once 
the fifth signatory has ratified the mli 
and deposited its instrument of ratifi-
cation with the oecd, the mli will enter 
into force on the first day of the month 
following the expiry of three calendar 
months beginning on the date of depo-
siting the ratification. and,
(2) The level of the parties to a given 
tax treaty; the entry into force of the 
mli for a given treaty is subject to the 
signing of the mli by both contacting 
countries to this tax treaty. Therefore 
two situations: first situation being , if 
both parties to a tax treaty sign the mli, 
and the mli is itself already in force, it 
shall enter into force with respect to a 
particular signatory on the first day of 
the month following the expiry of three 
calendar months  beginning on the date 
such signatory deposits its instrument 
of ratification, acceptance or approval:
 Second situation being, if one or both 
parties have not signed the mli, the 
latter will not enter into force and will 
not affect the provisions of a given tax 
treaty. 
D. Should Uganda sign or not  
sign the mli?
The feasibility study done concludes that 
despite potential challenges, mli is a promis-
ing way to quickly implement treaty-related 
beps measures. It was noted in the Action 15, 
beps 2015 Final report that some features of 
the current tax treaty system facilitate beps. 
The interrelationship between domestic tax 
laws and the international tax framework is 
akey pillar in supporting the growth of the 
global economy. However, as globalisation 
has changed the way business is done, the 
gaps and frictions that were always present 
in the existing bilateral tax treaties have 
grown more important. Existing tax trea-
ty provisions are sometimes exploited, in 
some cases in conjunction with domestic law 
rules, so that large amounts of income are not 
subject to tax in any jurisdiction. Moreover, 
the existing bilateral tax treaties vary widely 
in their details, including when the differenc-
es are not necessary to reflect specificities 
in the economic relations between the two 
contracting states. Rather, certain differenc-
es in detail appear to be due to the fact that 
treaties have been negotiated over a long 
42 (n.d.). Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related ... - oecd.org. Retrieved Sept-
ember 8, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-
treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.htm
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period of time, and in some circumstances 
these differences create opportunities for 
beps, which are then exploited by taxpay-
ers43. oecd, 2014 report made an emphasis 
that developing an mli is desirable and the 
benefits are numerous while burdens can be 
addressed or avoided.
Based on the mli information revealed 
by the oecd thus far, the mli likely would 
override the relevant parts of existing bilat-
eral treaties. However, given the optionality 
in the mli, this would require that partici-
pating countries and jurisdictions specify 
at the mli’s ratification which provisions of 
the mli they would opt into and out of. With 
the help of notifications by such countries, 
the oecd would then carry out a matching 
exercise and publicize information on which 
clauses in which treaties have actually been 
modified44.
On the 4th November 2015, Uganda be-
came the 90th jurisdiction to join the most 
powerful multilateral instrument against 
offshore tax evasion and avoidance. The 
Convention provides for all forms of admin-
istrative assistance in tax matters: exchange 
of information on request, spontaneous ex-
change, automatic exchange, tax examina-
tions abroad, simultaneous tax examinations 
and assistance in tax collection. It guarantees 
extensive safeguards for the protection of 
taxpayers’ rights. By signing the Conven-
tion, Uganda takes a further step in fighting 
tax evasion and avoidance, building on its 
participation in the Global Forum on Trans-
parency and Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes, which it joined in 2012.45 
A Global Forum official Godfrey Donal 
as he made  remarks at the Kampala Serena 
Conference Center on a  two-day interna-
tional workshop on information exchange 
stated that ‘stated that , Uganda is a thorough 
performer in Africa in terms of information 
exchange.We are impressed at the progress. 
Uganda has met all its targets in terms of the 
number of requests, Donal stated, adding, 
We hope Uganda can take this experience 
to other African countries’.46 it was how-
ever noted that Uganda has fairly limited 
experience in respect of incoming Exchange 
Of Information (eoi) request but it’s consid-
ered by it’s eoi partners to be an important 
partner47. There is no research yet done in 
Uganda to determine the  impact   of this 
43 (2015, October 5). Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral ... - oecd.org. Re-
trieved September 3, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/tax/developing-a-multilateral-instrument-
to-modify-bilateral-tax-treaties-action-15-2015-final-report-9789264241688-en.htm
44 (n.d.). Multilateral instrument to implement beps treaty-related ... - PwC. Retrieved September 
8, 2018, from https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/tax-policy-bulletin/assets/pwc-multi-
lateral-instrument-to-implement-beps-recommendations.pdf
45 (n.d.). Uganda becomes the 90th jurisdiction to join the most ... - oecd.org. Retrieved September 
11, 2018, from http://www.oecd.org/countries/uganda/uganda-becomes-the-90th-jurisdiction-to-
join-the-most-powerful-multilateral-instrument-against-offshore-tax-evasion-and-avoidance.htm
46 (n.d.). uganda hailed for information sharing - Uganda Revenue Authority. Retrieved September 
11, 2018, from https://www.ura.go.ug/readMore.do?contentId=999000000000893&type=readM
orePageDwnldAspdf
47 (n.d.). Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax .... Retrieved 
September 11, 2018, from https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/global-forum-on-transparency-
and-exchange-of-information-for-tax-purposes-peer-reviews-uganda-2016_9789264266209-en
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information received by ura  and its impact 
on tax revenue collections. 
As earlier cited out in this article , Ugan-
da’s existing treaties still had issues that 
needed to be addressed for example ;  trea-
ty shopping through the Dutch treaty, the 
weak Permanent Establishment provisions 
etc all these identified issues needed to be 
addressed in order to enhance tax revenue 
collections with in the country. More so with 
the current oil industry that is developing in 
Uganda has already attracted an influx of 
foreign expatriates and companies (Perma-
nent Establishments) in this industry. This 
hence calls for strong legislations (domestic 
laws) that will tax these Permanent Estab-
lishments to avoid tax revenue loss.
In conclusion, drawing from all my ear-
lier discussions, in the author’s opinion, 
Uganda should sign the mli as this creates 
an opportunity for Uganda to strengthen it’s 
existing tax treaties for example widen its 
pe provisions which would expand the tax 
base of Multinationals  enterprises operating 
in Uganda , more so the six and four month 
thresholds in Uganda’s treaties may not be 
short enough in the era where as one Finance 
ministry official pointed out, ‘the chinese 
can do things in three months’ (Hearson and 
Jalia 2016) etc. More so  mli  come with 
several advantages, First, they provide for 
broad mutual assistance, and on a multilat-
eral ,which, basis for example,would  permit 
joint assessment of the multinational by a 
consortium of tax authorities (Hearson and 
Brooks 2010). 
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